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Humans have a tendency to impute structure spontaneously even in simple learning tasks,
however the way they approach structure learning can vary drastically. The present study sought
to determine why individuals learn structure differently. One hypothesized explanation for
differences in structure learning is individual differences in cognitive control. Cognitive control
allows individuals to maintain representations of a task and may interact with reinforcement
learning systems. It was expected that individual differences in propensity to apply cognitive
control, which shares component processes with hierarchical reinforcement learning, may
explain how individuals learn structure differently in a simple structure learning task. Results
showed that proactive control and model-based control explained differences in the rate at which
individuals applied structure learning.

DEDICATION
The following is dedicated to Caroline Douglass. Without your daily love, support, and
inspiration, none of this would have been possible.

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS
DEDICATION ................................................................................................................................ ii
LIST OF TABLES ......................................................................................................................... iv
LIST OF FIGURES .........................................................................................................................v
CHAPTER
I.

INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................1
Relationship of Task-Set Structure Learning and Reinforcement Learning .....................3
Cognitive Control and Structure Learning ......................................................................11
Individual Differences in Cognitive Control and Structure Learning .......................15

II.

METHOD .......................................................................................................................18
Participants ......................................................................................................................18
Tasks .............................................................................................................................19
Structure Learning .....................................................................................................19
Individual Differences ...............................................................................................25
Two-Step Task.....................................................................................................25
Cognitive Control ................................................................................................27
Fluid Intelligence .................................................................................................29
Data Analysis...................................................................................................................29

III.

RESULTS .......................................................................................................................33
Error Optimality ..............................................................................................................37
Accuracy ..........................................................................................................................46

IV.

DISCUSSION .................................................................................................................60

REFERENCES ..............................................................................................................................68
APPENDIX
A.

IRB APPROVAL LETTER ............................................................................................73

iii

LIST OF TABLES
Table 1

Summary Statistics for Individual Differences Measures ...........................................34

Table 2

Model fit: Error Optimality ..........................................................................................43

Table 3

Model fit: Accuracy .....................................................................................................48

Table 4

Model fit: Condition Repetition ...................................................................................54

iv

LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1

Task Sets ........................................................................................................................7

Figure 2

Reinforcement Learning Algorithm ...............................................................................8

Figure 3

Hierarchical Reinforcement Learning..........................................................................11

Figure 4

Cognitive Control in Reinforcement Learning ............................................................14

Figure 5

Associative Learning Task ...........................................................................................20

Figure 6

Color Cues ...................................................................................................................21

Figure 7

Keysets .........................................................................................................................22

Figure 8

Two-Step Task .............................................................................................................26

Figure 9

Distribution of Model-Based Control ..........................................................................34

Figure 10 Error Optimality ...........................................................................................................39
Figure 11 Error Optimality by Proactive Control ........................................................................41
Figure 12 Distribution of Error Optimality ..................................................................................45
Figure 13 Mean Response Accuracy ............................................................................................47
Figure 14 Rate of Learning by Fluid Intelligence ........................................................................50
Figure 15 Proactive Control by Condition Repetition..................................................................52
Figure 16 Model-based Control by Condition Repetition ............................................................56
Figure 17 Rate of Learning Across Condition Repetitions by Model-based Control ..................57

v

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Humans tend to impute structure arbitrarily and spontaneously when learning even when
it is not expressly beneficial to do so (Collins et al., 2014). The way this structure is learned and
the effectiveness with which structure information is used may vary between individuals (Newlin
& Moss, 2020), leading to categorically different patterns of behavior within even very simple
tasks. Stable individual differences in the cognitive mechanisms used in simple learning tasks
may explain why people tend to vary in the strategies they use to facilitate learning.
In computational models of reinforcement learning (RL), task states represent points
where a decision must be made (Collins, 2018; Sutton & Barto, 1998). The state space is the set
of possible states in a task, and actions are decisions or behaviors that transition from one state to
another. RL processes learn the value of different states so that the agent can make effective
decisions about which action to take at each state. Structure learning reduces the burden of
exploring all potential states in a space by reducing the dimensionality of the state space. For
example, the first move in a game of Tic Tac Toe presents a task with nine possible moves that
result in nine different states. If you recognize that the board is symmetrical, however, then the
number of possible moves is reduced from nine initial moves to three initial moves with three
different future states. Applying this symmetry rule to the first move in a Tic Tac Toe game
illustrates how states within a state space can be reduced by having an appropriate representation
that takes advantage of the structure of a task.
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In complex problems, a single state space may be insufficient to represent the possible
states or choices. Instead, a hierarchically-organized learning space composed of multiple state
spaces can be constructed (Collins, 2018), in which a higher-level loop learns which of two (or
more) state spaces to select and a lower-level loop learns associations for either of the two
simpler state spaces. In this Hierarchical Reinforcement Learning (HRL) process, computations
may happen over multiple state spaces in one problem, and signals from the more abstract
higher-level loop provide context for choices made at the lower level of the hierarchy. This
hierarchical organization of contingent choices, organized by context, can be explained in terms
of task sets.
A task-set is a set of representations and processes needed to respond appropriately to a
given task (Monsell, 2017). The rules that compose a task set can be organized to take advantage
of the structure in a task that indicates which response is more likely to be successful. Whether
the task set is organized in a manner that takes advantage of the structure in a task has
implications for how the task set will transfer to variants of the original task. For example, when
an individual learns a new programming language, there are many elements and techniques that
are transferable between languages, even when the syntax and surface features vary substantially.
A programmer who recognizes the generalizable loops and patterns of one language will have a
much easier time learning the new language, even if they appear very different. If the task-sets
constructed in the initial programming language incorporate the abstract, mechanistic
components of the procedure, then they can be generalized to the new language and facilitate
learning. Some individuals seem to be better than others at creating transferrable task sets,
leading to differences not only in the rate of future learning but in the behaviors expressed during
the learning process (Collins & Frank, 2013).
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Utilizing the structure of a task can facilitate learning, particularly in new contexts;
however, not all people learn structure, and people can approach structure learning in drastically
different ways. For example, prior research using a simple association learning task in which
participants learned associations between sets of categorically similar stimuli and a unique
keypress indicated that some individuals learn a higher-level association between a context and
the keys used for the associations, while others learn only individual associations between
stimuli and keypresses (Collins & Frank, 2013).
The present study will explore why people tend to learn structure differently even in
simple learning tasks by examining how individual differences in cognitive control relate to
structure learning. Cognitive control is a set of functions that maintains a representation of the
current task in working memory by inhibiting automatic responses and selecting between control
mechanisms (Botnivick & Braver, 2015). Collins and Frank (2013) explored the relationship
between cognitive control and learning using computational and neural models, demonstrating
how individuals may infer structure and use cognitive control to either apply structure in a new
context or create a new rule (or task set). Based on this previously proposed relationship between
structure learning and cognitive control (Collins & Frank, 2013), I predict that there is a stable
individual difference in cognitive control that informs how people explore the task representation
space and identify structure. Much of the prior work examining structure learning has been
conducted within the theoretical framework of RL with associative learning tasks (Collins et al.,
2014; Collins, 2018).
Relationship of Task-Set Structure Learning and Reinforcement Learning
Task sets are hierarchically structured stimulus-action-outcome contingencies organized
by a shared context. For example, in a task-switching study, one task may be to decide whether a
3

number is even or odd. The second task may be to say whether a number is less than or greater
than 5. The correct task could be indicated by some cue to establish the appropriate context so
that the rules for the correct task (i.e., the task set) are applied. The rules for the tasks are
stimulus-action-outcome contingencies and are linked to the appropriate contextual cues that
indicate when those rules should be used. First, a decision is made regarding which action or set
of actions is appropriate for the context that is associated with the stimulus. Then, the actions in
response to the stimulus are selected according to which action has the highest probability of
eliciting a reward. In HRL, a task context representation (e.g., performing the parity task
described above) is maintained in working memory, and all responses are learned with reference
to that context. However, it is also possible to learn to respond appropriately in a task without
learning the hierarchical relationship between context and appropriate actions (i.e., without
utilizing the structure of the task). If the task structure is not used in learning to respond to the
task, then learning may be slower and may not transfer to tasks with a similar structure.
Choosing to maintain a task context representation in working memory is a cognitive
control function necessary for structure learning via HRL, and therefore individual differences in
cognitive control may be associated with structure learning. Consider the case of a simple
association learning task (Collins, 2018), where participants are asked to learn the association
between a keypress and an image, through feedback, without prior knowledge of the images or
the relationship between keypresses and images. For example, if an image of a square is
presented, one might guess that the “a” key is correct. Correct/incorrect feedback is then
provided, after which the next image is displayed. After several presentations of the square, the
participant can eventually learn the correct stimulus-keypress association. This association
learning task can be extended to include additional features that provide more information that
4

can optionally be used to improve performance. A secondary characteristic of the task, such as a
color cue, could be associated with a set of keys available to respond with. This color cue
represents a context within the task that allows for the creation of task sets, or a secondary
association between context and the appropriate set of actions that may or may not be learned. In
this task, learning associations without using context information is possible; however,
establishing the association between the color cue and available actions facilitates learning by
constraining exploration to the set of keys associated with a given color context rather than all
available keys.
Whereas a state space represents all potential states that an agent can transition to in a
task, an action space represents the available actions that an agent can use to move between
states (Botnivick, Niv, & Barto, 2008; Collins, 2018). The hierarchical nature of this association
learning task can be described in terms of state spaces and action spaces, or the available actions
that can transition between states. In this task, the state space would be the stimuli, while the
action space would be the possible keypresses that might lead to a reward out of the total number
of keys available. When a stimulus is presented, a decision must be made about which action in
the action spaces is appropriate to lead to a reward. The color cue provided with the stimulus
presents an additional, higher-order state, in which a decision must be made about which
combination of keys will be more likely to transition to a high value state. The abstract, top-level
loop represented here has a separate action space composed of the previously learned task sets
that may be relevant for the current task, and a decision must be made about which task set is the
best fit. If only a specific subset of 2 keys has the potential to lead to a reward, then the
extraneous dimensions (the third and fourth keys) can be eliminated, reducing the number of
potential states and simplifying the state space.
5

Structure learning is observable in this association learning task based on the rate of
learning in a new context and the types of errors made in the new context (Collins, 2017; Collins
& Frank, 2013). Although slow during initial learning, structure learning leads to faster learning
in a new context when that new context uses the same task set, demonstrated in Figure 1.
Additionally, individuals express asymmetrical errors, in which a context-congruent rule is
selected correctly but lower-level behavior is in error. In the association learning task,
participants may choose the correct set of keys to respond with, indicating that they have
recognized and applied the information available from the color cue, but may still produce the
incorrect response from that pair of keys. This error is more informative than other types of
errors and leads to faster learning.

6

Figure 1
Task Sets
Note. Task sets are composed of stimulus-action-outcome contingencies organized by shared
context (Collins & Frank, 2013). Contexts 1 and 2 have different task sets (state-action rules).
After learning the stimulus associations for S1 and S2, when the context is reinstated, the state
space is significantly reduced for learning the actions for S3 and S4 by searching for the correct
action only amongst actions A1 and A2. Correctly reinstating Context 2 for learning the actions
for S3 and S4 would also result in reduced search amongst only A3 and A4. However,
attempting to map rules from Context 1 to Context 2 will result in a specific pattern of errors for
S3 and S4 as a form of negative transfer by leading to actions A1 and A2.

There are different RL algorithms which can learn this task, and the nature of the RL
algorithm determines the degree to which structure information is incorporated into what is
learned. In model-free RL, agents use an algorithm based on rewards and/or punishments
incurred while exploring an environment. The algorithm uses this information to assign value to
different possible actions in each state, guiding the selection of future actions as shown in Figure
2. In a model-based RL algorithm, the algorithm stores a representation of possible states along
with the actions that transition between those states. It then determines the optimal action in any
7

state based on its relative probability of transitioning to a high-value state that will eventually
yield a reward. Unlike model-based RL, model-free RL can only select an action based on
reward estimates of that action in a particular state and cannot represent the value of future
states. Consequently, model-free RL is unable to plan ahead to reach a high-value future state.
Both model-free and model-based algorithms learn to estimate the value of actions and states via
reinforcement prediction error (RPE). RPE is an error signal--the difference between the reward
expected and the reward received, that drives learning via updates to the estimated value of
actions and states (Collins, 2018; Montague et al., 1996).

Figure 2
Reinforcement Learning Algorithm
Note. Reinforcement learning uses value-based choices, or actions, to move between states. The
results of actions lead to reinforcement, which updates the reinforcement learning algorithm and
changes the state (Collins, 2018).
In both model-free and model-based learning, the RL algorithm, or transition function,
determines the estimated reward in each possible state as a function of the reward history. In a
complex environment, or one that has many potential states and actions that may lead to rewards,
8

updating an algorithm through feedback becomes challenging as the time to explore these states
increases exponentially and the perspective of the agent, even if memory is not a constraint, is
limited. Consequently, reinforcement learning struggles in complex environments where there
are numerous potential states to explore. This issue is referred to as the scaling problem
(Botnivick, Niv, & Barto, 2009; Collins, 2018), where exploring a state space is too inefficient to
explain accurate behavior in a complex environment. Complicated decisions over a space can
instead be transformed into a series of simpler, hierarchical decisions allowing for more efficient
exploration and transferability to new contexts. For example, if a complex task is decomposed
into a set of subtasks and if the subtasks have similar structures, then the actions learned in one
subtask transfer to the other subtasks. If there are only two types of subtasks, and all subtasks of
one type have the same state-action rules (i.e., task set), then the formerly complicated task is
reduced to a choice of which task set to apply to the current subtask. Choosing between two
subtask types is a much smaller action space than learning one set of state-action contingencies
for every potential state and action in the task. Agents can instead learn which subtask or task-set
will lead to a reward and learn to select the subtask through feedback.
Although structure learning is beneficial and, in some cases, necessary to complete
complex tasks, it is a costly process. In the initial stages of learning, task performance may
decrease as the agent attempts to simultaneously represent multiple alternative state-action
contingencies (Collins et al., 2014; Collins, 2017; Collins, 2018). This up-front cost, however,
affords greater flexibility and generalizability later. Reducing the dimensionality of state spaces
creates contingent rules that then can be transferred when the context for that subtask is
reinstated; processes to move between states for each state below that point in the hierarchy are
already in place without having to re-explore the space and devise the same solution. Task sets
9

then allow for transfer when the rule is activated (Collins, 2017; Rmus et al., 2020). The benefits
of allocating control when it is not immediately beneficial seems counterintuitive; however,
recent theoretical explanations of these phenomena suggest that agents factor in the benefits of
learning on the reduction in future effort when making cost-benefit judgements, leading to
scenarios where difficult tasks are preferable (Masis et al., 2021).
HRL describes a mechanism by which reinforcement learning occurs simultaneously at
multiple levels, and where reinforcement learning over abstract higher-level spaces (e.g., which
task set fits the current context) controls lower-level decisions about the specific action to take in
a state, as shown in Figure 3. Both model-based RL and model-free RL algorithms can be used
as learning algorithms in HRL. In practice, lower-level decisions are what ultimately lead to a
reward; however, reaching the lower-level state is a consequence of previous higher-level
decisions. By learning task-specific states and actions HRL minimizes the burden of exploration
by mapping potential states and actions only within a task or subtask. States and actions within
subtasks can then be learned independently, which limits the size of the space that must be
explored within the larger task. HRL has been proposed as a method for learning about the
structure of the task including a neurally-plausible computational model for how it is achieved
(Collins & Frank, 2013). Problem-solving research on isomorphs, problems with the same search
space, and often similar task set rules, has shown that factors other than structural similarity can
also affect the degree of transfer (Kotovsky & Fallside, 1989; Kotovsky, Hayes, & Simon, 1985).
Therefore, there may be aspects of structure learning or individual differences in structure
learning that are not represented within the RL framework. The present study seeks to identify
the processes that may determine the degree to which individuals are able to recognize structural
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similarities between contexts and strategically apply previously learned task sets to facilitate
learning.

Figure 3
Hierarchical Reinforcement Learning
Note. Higher-level decisions or rules constrain the space in which reinforcement learning
operates at lower levels. Multiple RL algorithms work in conjunction to reach a reward.
Cognitive Control and Structure Learning
Cognitive control is a set of functions that maintains a representation of the current task,
superordinate to memory, working memory, attention, and selection and inhibition processes that
helps coordinate these processes to perform a task (Botnivick & Braver, 2016). Cognitive control
balances goal-directed processes with other automatic behaviors, whether by maintaining a
representation of the current goal or inhibiting processes that do not pertain to the goal (Cohen,
2017). Cognitive processes operate on a continuum from controlled to automatic. Controlled
processes are slower to execute than automatic processes, act in tandem with or opposite to
automatic processes, and are managed by a central processing mechanism that is limited in its
11

capacity either by the structure of the mechanism itself or by the constraints imposed by the tasks
being managed (Cohen, 2017). Whether a process is controlled or automatic depends on the
context in which it is executed, and controlled processes can become automatic with practice and
through the creation of task sets, which package controlled processes into transferable units that
bias behavior in a task (Monsell, 2017).
Task sets, or organized packages of mental processes stored in long-term memory that
can be retrieved to complete a given task, operate in three discrete stages: acquisition, fluency,
and habit (Anderson, 1982; Monsell, 2017). In the acquisition stage, the task set transitions from
an initial declarative representation to a new representation called a procedure. The declarative
representation is a set of action-outcome pairings that can be learned through reinforcement or
through some form of instruction, whether it is explicit or a function of observation. During this
declarative stage, the representation of the steps to complete the task is held in memory, and the
steps are executed one by one in series. Through repetition, this declarative representation is
compiled into a procedure, a new representation that is activated by context and automatically
executes the component steps without the need for retrieval from declarative memory. With
further repetitions, context starts to activate the task set more and more automatically, and the
controlled process becomes habitual (Monsell, 2017). This model of cognitive skill acquisition
has significant implications for HRL and guides the behavioral predictions for the present study.
Skill acquisition is a controlled process, and therefore individual differences in cognitive control
should result in differences in task set creation. After the task set has been created, however, the
learned behavior is no longer a controlled process. Therefore, we would not expect to see any
differences between high and low cognitive control individuals after the task has been learned.
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The process of skill acquisition described by Anderson (1982) and Monsell (2017) can be
explained in terms of HRL. In HRL, cognitive control helps to direct the maintenance of the
context or goal guiding exploration of the state and action spaces. Essentially, cognitive control
is responsible for the compilation of representations into a production. Maintenance of the task
goal leads to organized task sets that subdivide the space, allowing the agent to select the
representation that is appropriate for the context. Task sets in reinforcement learning are
therefore action-reward associations organized by context, where the context identifies the
specific task or subtask. When a given context is reactivated, the task sets learned previously are
reactivated, and the task can be completed without having to re-explore the space. The ability to
reactivate a task set when the context is reinstated without recompiling or re-exploring the
elements of the state represents fluency or habit in the skill acquisition framework If the context
is not maintained during learning, then the action-reward associations are not associated with the
context, and reinstatement of the context does not lead to transfer. In other words, the conditional
probability of selecting the production compiled during the creation of the task set is not
sufficiently great for the task-set to be selected. In the association learning task described above,
the color cue and its association with the available key responses must be maintained during
learning in order to transfer to later blocks.
Cognitive control is believed to be responsible for providing these top-down biases by
actively maintaining a representation of the task and inhibiting irrelevant information, leading to
the creation of task sets (Botnivick & Cohen, 2014; Collins et al., 2014). Exploring the state
space activates the representations necessary to complete the task. Goal-directed mechanisms
monitor these representations, allowing cognitive control to make online updates to the task
representations, as shown in Figure 4. In the association learning task example, cognitive control
13

maintains the task set, or the association between context and the state-space being explored. If
the context changes, cognitive control determines which task set is appropriate for the new
context and activates it accordingly.

Figure 4
Cognitive Control in Reinforcement Learning
Note. Active maintenance of the task representation constrains exploration, which then updates
the representation. Goal-directed mechanisms moderate the representation maintained by
cognitive control (Botnivick & Cohen, 2014).
Cognitive control can be used via two different control strategies: proactive and reactive
control (Braver, 2012; Meier & Kane, 2017). Proactive control is a sustained form of control
where the task structure is continually maintained and updated. Reactive control is a stimulusdriven form of control in which the task representation is reactivated in response to a given
stimulus or change in the task environment. People more likely to use proactive cognitive control
in one task are more likely to express behavior consistent with model-based RL algorithms in
14

sequential decision tasks in which a two-step decision is used to determine the relative
probability of reward in potential states (Otto et al., 2014). In other words, proactive control may
represent the ability to maintain and update the task context during the creation of task sets, and
differences in the use of proactive control explain why some task sets transfer while others do
not. The ability to actively maintain a goal through proactive control and inhibit automatic
responses in reactive control may be modulated by working memory capacity (Meier & Kane,
2017), as a more robust working memory facilitates maintenance of a task goal in addition to
relevant task information. The exact nature of these processes and the role of working memory is
still unclear, and previous models of RL posit that working memory may interfere with RL
computations, inhibiting learning (Collins, 2018). The interaction between these processes is
beyond the scope of the present study. However, it seems that the use of proactive cognitive
control strategies may be one of the components involved in effectively recognizing structure
information and applying it to future learning. Therefore, I predict that differences in an
individual’s ability to apply proactive control will explain variability in structure learning,
expressed as faster learning when a context is reinstated and error patterns consistent with
selecting the correct task set.
Individual Differences in Cognitive Control and Structure Learning
Cognitive control and structure learning appear to share component processes and operate
in a reciprocal and parallel manner (Botnivick & Cohen, 2014; Collins & Frank, 2013).
Cognitive control is believed to be involved in the creation of task sets (Collins, 2017), which in
turn allows for the subdivision of state and action spaces. In other words, the state space can be
considered a set of features that cognitive control constrains and maintains via a context
representation, and the action space is the task set that updates that representation.
15

Evidence for individual differences in RL has been observed on a neurological level in
both healthy and clinical populations (Frank, 2005; Kool et al., 2016; Kool et al., 2017; Santesso
et al., 2008). Model-free RL was shown to be positively affected by dopaminergic drugs in
clinical patients with Parkinson’s disease, supporting the theory that RL occurs as a function of
dopamine pathways in the prefrontal cortex and basal ganglia. A structure learning task given to
healthy individuals demonstrated greater activation of the anterior cingulate cortex in
participants who made use of reward history in the task, indicating application of structural
elements or a model of the task (Santesso et al., 2008). This suggests that the same neurological
components involved in creating and managing task sets in cognitive control (Botnivick &
Cohen, 2014) are also involved in structure learning and that individual differences in learning
may be attributed to proactive cognitive control, since proactive control involves actively
maintaining goal-relevant information (Braver, 2012).
Behavioral evidence for individual differences in RL is less clear. Research in sequential
decision-making tasks has demonstrated strategic or behavioral differences in approaches to RL,
described as model-based and model-free RL. It is unclear, however, whether these strategies are
indicative of a stable individual difference or what mechanisms may influence the likelihood that
one strategy may be applied over another (Daw et al., 2011; Morris & Cushman, 2019). Modelbased control is the allocation of cognitive control resources to engage in model-based learning
and planning processes (Kool et al., 2017). Rather than examining only differences in capacity,
model-based control represents the actual use of control in a task scenario. Individuals appear to
vary in how likely they are to engage in model-based control, evidenced by differences between
individuals in the ability to represent alternative states and learn through negative feedback or
errors, but the reasons for this variation have not been explored (Kool et al., 2016; 2017).
16

Irrespective of capacity differences, the likelihood that model-based or model-free control will
be used varies between individuals in a manner that cannot only be explained solely by task
demands, as similar sequential choices may exhibit evidence of both model-free and modelbased control (Daw et al., 2011; Kool et al., 2016; 2017). Therefore, individual differences in
model-based or proactive control strategies should be expressed in terms of the propensity that
an individual shows to utilize these strategies.
The purpose of the present study is to determine how and why individuals differ in their
ability to learn about and apply structure in basic learning tasks. Individual differences in the
propensity to apply cognitive control, which shares component processes with HRL and modelbased RL, are expected to explain how individuals learn structure differently. If there is a
relationship between individual differences in cognitive control and structure learning, then that
would suggest that there is an effortful control process required to create task sets in HRL that
can be explained by the propensity to use cognitive control. Likewise, the propensity to use
cognitive control may also account for why there is variation in the likelihood of using modelbased control between individuals.

17

CHAPTER II
METHOD
The present study utilized a within-subjects design to explore the relationship between
individual differences in cognitive control and the ability to learn structure in an association
learning task. Participants completed measures of individual differences in their propensity to
use proactive control and model-based control. They then completed an association learning task
to assess structure learning, and the individual differences measures were used to explain
differences in the rate at which individuals recognize and learn structure. A measure of general
fluid intelligence was included to ensure that differences in the rate at which people learn
structure can be attributed to individual differences in cognitive control rather than fluid
intelligence.
Participants
Participants were recruited from the Prolific online research platform and received
financial compensation for completing the study. A power analysis was conducted using a
simulated generalized linear mixed effects model based on an existing model from pilot data
with an estimated fixed effect of the individual difference measures of cognitive control. A
significant interaction between the individual differences measures in cognitive control and
keyset size would be detected with power of .81 with 170 participants.
Exclusion criteria were used to screen out participants based on criteria used in prior
published work with each task. Participants were excluded if they did not meet an average
18

asymptotic performance of 75% correct on the association learning task (Collins, 2018).
Participants were also excluded if they made errors in more than 40% of the AXCPT trials
(Gonthier et al., 2016) or if they did not respond within the time limit in more than 20% of the
trials in the two-step task (Kool et al., 2017). A total of 177 participants successfully completed
all four tasks, and 7 were excluded because they met one or more of the exclusion criteria,
yielding 170 valid participants. Data were collected until the target of 170 participants
determined by the power analysis was reached.
Tasks
Structure Learning
The study used a modified version of an association learning task (Collins, 2018) with
added context cues to provide a task structure that can be learned. In addition to the primary task
of learning associations between images and key presses through feedback, illustrated in Figure
5, participants received additional context information in the form of a color cue that is indicative
of the set of keys that may lead to a correct response. After repeated presentations of the
stimulus, participants may learn not only the correct keypress associated with a single stimulus,
but also the set of two keys within the range of all available keys that may lead to a reward when
that color is presented.
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Figure 5
Associative Learning Task
Note. Stimuli are presented in a pseudo-randomized order for 1500 ms. Feedback is presented for
500 ms immediately after the response, followed by a 500-ms fixation.
The images were presented in blocks of categorically similar stimuli, with no overlap of
stimuli between blocks. Each block had two images (e.g., circle, square) with two associated
color contexts, creating four unique stimuli. Different sets of keypresses, or keysets, were used to
create discriminable stimulus-action-outcome contingencies between trials with different context
cues, illustrated in Figure 6. The same image appeared in two different colors, so processing the
color context cue was required to perform the task well. For example, a black triangle may be
associated with the “A” key while a white triangle is associated with the “D” key.
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Figure 6
Color Cues
Note. A single image has different correct responses depending on the context, as indicated by
the color of the image. There are 4 discrete stimulus-keypress associations to learn, but with only
two unique objects.
In addition to learning the association between the unique image and one of four possible
keys, participants may also learn associations between color cues and the set of keys within the
range of possible keys that can lead to a reward in that color context, as shown in Figure 7. Each
keyset associated with a color contains two keys out of four possible keys. In the cued condition,
one pair of colors repeats over multiple blocks such that each block with these colors used the
same two pairs of keys. Using the example in Figure 7, the black and white colors are repeated in
future blocks and black stimuli always used the “A” and “S” keys while white stimuli always
used the “D” and “F” keys. Colors were only ever repeated in cued blocks, providing
information about the structure of the task that participants may be able to learn. The uncued
condition contained two images with random color cues that have not been previously
encountered, therefore not providing any structure information about the keysets used in those
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blocks. Blocks in the uncued condition always used novel colors for each block, and there was
no overlap with colors used in the cued blocks. Participants were not informed about the
structure manipulation or how to use context information at any point during the task; instead,
they learned through feedback the contingencies between images and color mappings within a
block and the repeated context information between blocks.

Figure 7
Keysets
Note. Each color cue is associated with a set of keys that can be used for a given stimulus. The
cue-keyset association is transferable between blocks.
There are two potential ways to learn the stimulus – keypress associations. Participants
may make use of the color context information provided and learn a higher-order association
between color and keysets, or they may instead learn the response mappings for four separate
stimuli rather than incorporating the context information provided by the color cues. In other
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words, individuals may see the color as simply a combined feature of the stimulus rather than
another level in a hierarchy. If participants represent the color and object information as separate
levels in a hierarchy, then we would expect faster learning and more informative errors when the
color is reused in later cued blocks. If participants represent the color information as a combined
feature of the stimulus, we expect there to be no difference in performance between the cued
blocks and the uncued blocks because all blocks use unique images.
The keysets for the uncued blocks were assigned at random and did not overlap with the
keysets from the cued blocks. The colors used for the cued blocks were also randomized across
participants. There were 14 blocks of images: seven cued blocks that used the same two-color
cues, and seven uncued blocks with random color cues and no transferable context information.
The presentation of these conditions was ordered such that following the first presentation of
each condition, the conditions were encountered pseudo-randomly, with a uniform distribution of
blocks from each condition. Each block contained a variable number of trials based on a
performance criterion, with a minimum of 60 trials, or 15 repetitions per stimulus, and a
maximum of 120 trials. Once participants reliably produced the correct response 80% of the time
for each stimulus after at least 15 repetitions of each stimulus, the associations were considered
to be well learned and the block was terminated. Within each block, repeated presentations of
each stimulus were pseudo-randomized so that the delay between repetitions of the same
stimulus was uniform. Twenty-five different randomized sets of keyset-color mappings and
keypress-image mappings were created, and each participant was randomly assigned to one of
these sets. These predetermined sets were used because the pseudorandomization process can be
time-consuming.

23

The goal of the manipulation is to determine if participants are learning four unique
stimulus-keypress associations in each block or if they are learning color-keypress-stimulus
contingencies that transfer between blocks. If individuals learn the association between the color
cue and the set of keys available to be used for a given trial, they should be able to transfer the
existing keyset rather than searching for the keyset, resulting in higher accuracy starting on the
first stimulus presentation and potentially also an improved rate of learning. There are two
potential error types: context errors and trial errors. Context errors involve using keys outside of
the keyset for a given color, and therefore represent an error at the context level (using the “F”
key in the black context in Figure 6). Trial errors are simply errors in the association between the
context-appropriate keypress and the image stimulus (using the “A” key in a black context for an
image where the correct key is S in Figure 6). If individuals do not learn the structure, then there
will be no difference between the cued condition and the control condition for either accuracy or
error type. If they do learn the structure, then there should be more trial errors in the cued blocks,
where the incorrect key is selected for the image, but the key is present in the correct keyset for
that color.
A measure of error optimality, or the rate of errors that provide information about the
correct image-keypress association, was used to represent context usage. Error optimality was
calculated as the proportion of trial errors, or incorrect keypresses within the keyset, over the
total number of errors, including both trial errors and context errors. The error optimality
calculation is expressed in Equation 1.
Error Optimality =

𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟𝑠
𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟𝑠 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑥𝑡 𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟𝑠
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(1)

Learning accuracy was examined during early trials of a block. In this case, an early trial
is the first 10 stimulus repetitions in the block, as determined via pilot work on how long it takes
to reach asymptotic learning performance.
Individual Differences
Two-Step Task
The two-step task measured a base-rate propensity to employ model-based control (Kool
et al., 2016; Kool et al., 2017). In the two-step task, individuals make sequential decisions
between pairs of stimuli that navigate them between stages. As shown in Figure 8, there are two
possible states in the first stage and two possible states in the second stage.
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Figure 8
Two-Step Task
Note. There are two possible first stage and second stage states. The choice in the first stage
determine the state in the second stage. Responses in the second stage lead to a reward that
changes over the course of the task. Participants create a model of the task and use rewards from
the second stage to inform decisions in the first stage of the following trial, regardless of whether
the state matches the previous first stage. Reprinted from “Cost-benefit arbitration between
multiple reinforcement-learning systems,” by W. Kool, S. J. Gershman, F. A. Chsuman.
2017, Psychological Science, 28(9), 1321–1333.
The first stage choices are associated with two possible second stages, and each second
stage choice is associated with some reward value. The reward values in the second stage change
over the course of the task, requiring individuals to continuously explore the space. To perform
optimally in the task, participants must employ a model-based form of reinforcement learning, in
which first stage choices make optimal second stages more likely. If model-based reinforcement
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learning is indeed being used, the rewards from the second stage should inform decisions made
in the first stage regardless of whether the next trial starts with the same or a different state in
stage 1. The value of a choice at both first-stage states can be updated on every trial because
there is a model of the transition between the states at the first stage and the resulting second
stage. If model-free reinforcement learning is used, then rewards from the second stage only
update the value of choices in the immediately preceding state of the first stage that was just
experienced on the current trial. This occurs because there is no model of the state structure of
the task that can be used to adjust the action values of the stage 1 state that was not shown in the
current trial.
In each trial, participants were presented with a pair of stimuli side by side and were
asked to select between them within a response window of 1,500 ms. Their response then led to
one of two second stage states, where they were asked to respond within 1,500 ms to receive a
reward. Rewards changed over the course of the task using a Gaussian random walk. An
individual’s behavior in this task can be fit to a combined model-free and model-based
reinforcement learning algorithm where choices are made based on a weighted combination of
the values estimated by both the model-free and model-based algorithms. The weighting of these
two algorithms in choice behavior can be recovered from behavioral data (Kool et al., 2016). The
same model and associated weighting parameters yielded a parameter estimate of the propensity
to engage in model-based control.
Cognitive Control
Individual differences in propensity to use proactive control were measured using the
AX-CPT (Braver et al., 2007; Braver, 2012; Gonthier et al., 2016). The AX-CPT prompts
participants to respond to a target stimulus based on the cue preceding that stimulus. Participants
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respond to the target stimulus (the letter “X”) by pressing a key and respond to the non-target
stimulus by pressing a different key. The letter “X”is only the target, however, when it is
preceded by the letter “A”. If the letter “X” is preceded by any other letter, such as the letter “B”,
then it is not the target stimulus and should not receive the target keypress. Similarly, if the cue
letter “A” is followed by a letter other than “X”, such as “Y”, then that letter is also a non-target.
The task is therefore sensitive to both proactive and reactive control strategies. The use of
proactive control leads to lower performance in AY trials as individuals prepare a response from
the cue letter “A” and do not inhibit a response to the non-target letter “Y”. The use of reactive
control leads to lower performance in the BX trials as individuals do not maintain the letter “B”
and make a slower response to the letter “X” because the prior cue must be retrieved.
The present study utilized an AX-CPT design composed of 72 trials. The trials were
composed of 29 target, or AX pairs; seven pairs with a valid cue and invalid target (AY), seven
pairs with an invalid cue and a valid target (BX), and 29 pairs with an invalid cue and invalid
target (BY). The cue stimulus was presented for 500 ms, followed by a 4000-ms interval. The
probe letter (target or non-target) letter was presented for 500 ms, followed by an intertrial screen
with a row of asterisks for 1500 ms. Participants were asked to respond to the stimulus with the
correct key as quickly as possible, with a total response window of 1500 ms. Each trial lasts a
total of 6500 ms. Data yielded a measure of proactive control propensity for each participant.
The propensity to engage in proactive control can be measured by subtracting response times for
correct responses in the BX trials from response times in the AY trials (Gonthier et al., 2016). A
higher positive value indicates more interference in AY trials, which would suggest a greater
degree of proactive control. Instead of a simple subtraction, estimates of proactive control
propensity for each participant (BX-AY) were derived by using the per participant estimate of
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the random slope for a BX-AY contrast from a linear mixed effects model (Rouder & Haaf,
2019).
Fluid Intelligence
Individual differences in general fluid intelligence were measured using the Letter Series
Task (Kyllonen et al., 2019; Simon & Kotovsky, 1963). The Letter Series Task was included as a
general measure of intelligence to ensure that differences in performance on the association
structure learning task can be attributed to individual differences in cognitive control, not general
fluid intelligence. In this task, participants are presented with a series of letters that change
according to a fixed pattern and are asked to provide the next letter in the series. For example, in
the letter series ‘A C E G I K ?’ , each letter is two letters ahead of the previous letter. Therefore,
the correct letter in the example series would be ‘M’. Each problem may involve one or multiple
rules for a single letter series. To complete the task, participants must successfully identify the
rule or rules and apply the rule to make a prediction about the next item in the series. The present
study used a 15-item short form of the letter series test. Each item had a time limit of 1 minute,
for a total duration of 15 minutes.
Data Analysis
Data were analyzed using generalized linear mixed-effects models with block, cue, and
individual difference measures as predictors of error optimality and accuracy. Model-based
control and proactive control have a strong theoretical link and were expected to share a large
proportion of variance, potentially providing multiple measures of a single, unitary cognitive
control construct. To avoid issues of collinearity, it was determined that scores with a correlation
greater than .3 should be entered as a composite score rather than separate predictors.
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The impact of individual differences in cognitive control on error optimality was
measured at the block level using a linear mixed-effects model. Error optimality (Equation 1)
was modeled by cue condition, condition repetition, and individual difference measures as
predictors. Individuals with a greater propensity to apply cognitive control are expected to have a
higher proportion of optimal errors, as demonstrated by a three-way interaction between
condition repetition, cue, and individual difference measure. The model can be specified as
follows:

𝑖𝑗 = (0 + 0𝑖 +0𝑗 ) + (1 + 1𝑖 + 1𝑗 ) 𝑥 𝐵𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑁 + (2 + 2𝑖 + 2𝑗 ) 𝑥 𝐶𝑢𝑒𝑑
+ 3 𝑥 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 + 4 𝑥 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑥 𝐶𝑢𝑒𝑑 + 5 𝑥 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑥 𝐵𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑁
+ 6 𝑥 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑥 𝐶𝑢𝑒𝑑 𝑥 𝐵𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑁

(2)

Where error optimality for block i for participant j is predicted by the intercept 0 , with
participant (0𝑖 ) random intercepts; condition repetition block number (1 ) with participant
(1𝑖 ) random slopes; cue condition (2 ) with participant (2𝑖 ) random slopes; individual
difference control measure (3 ); the interaction of control and cue (4 ); the interaction of control
and condition repetition block number (5 ); and, the interaction of control, cue, and condition
repetition block number (6 ). Condition repetition block number BlockN was coded such that 0
indicates the first block for a given condition so that the intercept represents proportion of
context keyset errors over total errors at the first presentation of the condition. In this model,
Cued represents the cue condition, or whether or not there was a context present for the block,
and Control represents a measure of individual differences in cognitive control. The AX-CPT
and two-step task measures of control were entered as separate regressors.
A logistic mixed-effects regression was used to calculate the slope of learning using the
number of repeated stimulus presentations for a given stimulus and measures of individual
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differences in cognitive control as predictors to predict accuracy during early trials (where the
slope is expected to be mostly linear before asymptote). The generalized linear model can be
specified as follows:

𝑙𝑜𝑔 (

𝜋𝑖𝑗
) = (𝛽0 + 𝑢0𝑖 + 𝑢0𝑗 + 𝑢0𝑘 ) + (𝛽1 + 𝑢1𝑖 + 𝑢1𝑗 + 𝑢1𝑘 ) 𝑥 𝑆𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑁
1 − 𝜋𝑖𝑗
+ (𝛽2 + 𝑢2𝑖 + 𝑢2𝑗 + 𝑢2𝑘 )𝑥𝐶𝑢𝑒𝑑 + 𝛽3 𝑥𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 + 𝛽4 𝑥𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑥𝐶𝑢𝑒𝑑
+ 𝛽5 𝑥𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑥𝑆𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑁 + 𝛽6 𝑥𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑥𝐶𝑢𝑒𝑑𝑥𝑆𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑁

(3)

Where the log odds of a correct response for item i for participant j is predicted by the intercept
𝛽0, with participant (𝑢0𝑖 ), item (𝑢0𝑗 ), and color (𝑢0𝑘 ) random intercepts; stimulus repetition (𝛽1 )
with participant (𝑢1𝑖 ), item (𝑢1𝑗 ), and color (𝑢1𝑘 ) random slopes; cue condition
(𝛽2 ) with participant (𝑢2𝑖 ), item (𝑢2𝑗 ), and color (𝑢2𝑘 ) random slopes; individual differences
in control (𝛽3 ); the interaction of control and cue (𝛽4 ); the interaction of control and stimulus
repetition (𝛽5); and, the interaction of control, cue, and stimulus repetition (𝛽6 ). Stimulus
repetition (StimN) was coded such that 0 indicates the first presentation of the stimulus so that
the intercept represents accuracy at the 0th stimulus repetition. Similar to the error optimality
model, Cued represents the cue condition, or whether or not there was a context present for the
block, and Control represents the measure of individual differences in cognitive control.
Individuals who score higher on the two-step task and AX-CPT were expected to learn
the correct response mapping earlier than their low cognitive control counterparts, as indicated
by an interaction between cue condition and the individual difference measures. In each model,
the primary hypothesis being evaluated is that 4 will be greater than zero showing that accuracy
differences across the cue conditions (cued compared to uncued) is positively associated with the
cognitive control measure. In addition, 4 and 6 may also be greater than zero showing that the
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difference across the cueing conditions in intercept and slope of stimulus repetition respectively
is also associated with the control measure. General fluid intelligence was then entered into a
model with the individual difference measures to determine if the effect of cognitive control is
eliminated by general intelligence.
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CHAPTER III
RESULTS
The individual difference measures were z-scored prior to analysis. Table 1 shows a
summary of the unscaled scores for the letter series task, two stage task, and AX-CPT. Scores
were generally normally distributed for the letter series task and AX-CPT, however the model
parameter extracted from the two-stage task was somewhat bifurcated, as depicted in Figure 9.
This indicates that individuals are categorically different in their ability to apply model-based
control; some individuals demonstrate a capacity and propensity for model-based control, while
others use exclusively model-free learning in the two-stage task.
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Figure 9
Distribution of Model-Based Control
Note. The distribution of parameters extracted from the Two-Stage Model was bifurcated,
indicating that some participants used exclusively model-based control and others used
exclusively model-free control. There was a substantial proportion of participants who used
some combination of both forms of control; however, the distribution was not uniform.
Table 1
Summary Statistics for Individual Differences Measures
Measure
Letter Series
AX-CPT
Two Stage

M

SD

Skew

Kurtosis

0.67

0.22

-0.73

2.96

0

0.04

-0.98

4.35

0.62

0.36

-0.61

1.97
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According to the analysis plan, the correlations between individual differences were
examined to determine whether proactive control and model-based control should be entered as
separate or composite scores into the regression model. Although model-based control and
proactive control were significantly correlated (r = .23, p = .003), they did not meet the r = 0.30
threshold to be entered as a composite score into the model. Because the two measures share
little common variance, they may be separate constructs, rather than multiple measures of a
unitary cognitive control construct; however, it is unclear if this low correlation indicates the
absence of a meaningful relationship or can be attributed to low reliability. General fluid
intelligence and model-based control were also significantly correlated (r = .19, p = .01);
however, they similarly shared little common variance. General fluid intelligence and proactive
control were not significantly correlated (r = .07, p = .37). Partial correlations revealed that
proactive control was significantly related to model-based control even after accounting for fluid
intelligence (t = 76.55, p <.001), potentially indicating that something other than fluid
intelligence explains the shared variance between the propensity to use proactive control and
model-based control. An analysis of the reliability of the individual difference measures used in
the present study was performed to determine the degree to which low reliability could explain
the low correlation.
Split-half reliability was assessed for each of the individual difference measures. An
intraclass correlation was calculated for each of the individual difference tasks except for the
letter series task, wherein the items were independent of one another. In the structure task, the
random slope for each participant by cue type was correlated with the respective half of the task
items at ICC = 0.54, indicating moderate reliability. A similar model was specified for the two
halves of the AX-CPT using an independent data source with N = 95. Results showed an ICC of
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0.48, indicating low to moderate reliability. For the two-step task, model parameters were
extracted for the first and second half of items in the main trials of the task. The intraclass
correlation was calculated for the mixture weight parameter, revealing an ICC of 0.31,
suggesting low split-half reliability. Finally, the reliability of the Letter Series task was assessed
using Tau Equivalent reliability for even/odd items, indicating a reliability coefficient of .78.
These results suggest moderate to high reliability for the letter series task. Results from these
analyses indicate that reliability is a substantial concern for each of the measures used in the
present study, except for the letter series task. However, it should be noted that the attempt to
measure the reliability of the two-step task in this manner by splitting the task into two halves
violates the assumptions of the model from which the mixture weight parameter was derived.
The model assumes that participants have no prior knowledge of the value of the states at the
start of the trials, but that is obviously not true for the start of the second half of the trials. A
study utilizing two separate blocks or sessions of the two-step task would be needed to assess its
reliability.
Individuals who show a greater capacity for and likelihood to utilize cognitive control
were expected to be more likely than individuals with low cognitive control to utilize higherlevel structural elements in the association learning task, as evidenced by a higher error
optimality and faster learning when the context is reinstated in later blocks. This pattern of
results would suggest that individual differences in how people employ cognitive control
determine the degree to which individuals are able to recognize and use structure in
reinforcement learning. It was also expected that there would be no difference in performance
between individuals with high cognitive control and low cognitive control in uncued blocks,
where there is no discernible structure to learn. Similarly, it was expected that general fluid
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intelligence would not predict the rate of learning when the context is reinstated in later blocks or
a lower number of errors in context-keyset associations. This pattern of results would suggest
that cognitive control is responsible for learning structure specifically and not a general greater
ability to learn associations.
Error Optimality
Trial errors are those where a key consistent with the context information is pressed even
though it is not the correct for that stimulus. The other type of error, context errors, occurs when
a key is pressed outside of the keyset indicated by the context. The proportion of errors that are
trial errors is a measure of error optimality that should increase as the cued condition is repeated,
and this relationship can be seen in Figure 10. For each stimulus, there is one correct key;
meaning that the probability of a correct response when selecting from keys at random is .25. For
each correct key, there are three possible incorrect keys; one key within the correct keyset, which
would indicate a trial error, and two keys outside of the correct keyset, which would result in a
context error. Therefore, the probability that an incorrect response is a trial error is
approximately .33, and the probability that an incorrect response is a context error is .67. If no
structure learning occurs, then the rate of trial errors per block would be expected to be
approximately .33. If perfect structure learning occurs, then the proportion of optimal errors in
late blocks, after the structure has been learned, should be equal to 1. As illustrated in Figure 10,
the proportion of optimal errors in the uncued blocks remains constant across condition
repetitions at approximately the expected chance rate of .33. In the cued blocks, the proportion of
trial errors is much higher as the task progresses, up to a threshold of about .5. This may indicate
that there is some variability in context use between participants in the cued blocks, which may
be explained by cognitive control.
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The general linear mixed-effects model described in Eq. 2 was fit to the data, and the
model fit is shown in Table 2. If structure learning was indeed occurring, error optimality should
increase over the course of the task in the cued condition but not in the uncued condition,
evidenced by an interaction between condition repetition and cue type. There was an overall
increase in error optimality over the course of the task and a greater increase in error optimality
in the cued condition compared to the uncued condition, providing evidence for structure
learning (t = 4.32, p < .001).
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Figure 10
Error Optimality
Note. There was a greater proportion of trial errors (error optimality) in the cued condition than
in the uncued condition. Error optimality increased in the cued condition as the task progressed,
but not in the uncued condition where there was no structure to learn. Error bars indicate one
standard error.
It was predicted that a greater capacity or propensity to use cognitive control would result
in greater error optimality. There was a significant three-way interaction between condition
repetition, cue type, and proactive control (t = 2.42, p = .02), indicating that high proactive
control individuals apply structure learning to cued blocks earlier in the task than their low
proactive control counterparts. This suggests that structure is learned faster for high proactive
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control individuals than low proactive control individuals. The interaction between condition
repetition, cue type, and proactive control is illustrated in Figure 11.
An alternative explanation for the interaction between proactive control, cue type, and
condition repetition is that individuals higher in proactive control are simply better at the
association learning component of the task, irrespective of the structure manipulation. To test
this alternative or supplemental explanation of the findings, an additional model of error
optimality was specified including mean accuracy for the block as a covariate. Results showed
that after controlling for accuracy, there was still a significant interaction between cue condition,
condition repetition, and proactive control (t = 2.79, p = .005). The results from this model
indicate that differences in error optimality in the structure task can indeed be attributed to
individual differences in propensity to apply proactive control.
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Figure 11
Error Optimality by Proactive Control
Note. There is a steeper slope in the cued condition for high proactive control subjects compared
to low proactive control subjects, indicating that the high proactive control subjects applied
structure learning earlier in the task than low proactive control subjects. There is no difference
between high proactive control and low proactive control participants for the uncued blocks,
where there was no discernable structure to learn. Proactive control was split into high, medium,
and low groups based on a tertile split for the figure, but it is treated as a continuous variable in
the analysis. Error bars indicate one standard error.
A series of contrasts was conducted to examine this interaction to see if the difference in
slopes between cue conditions was greater for high proactive control subjects than low proactive
control subjects. The slope for the cued condition was significantly different from 0 for both the
high proactive control (t = 6.31, p < .001) and low proactive control individuals (t = 3.73, p =
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.002). The contrasts revealed that the difference in error optimality between conditions from the
first condition repetition to the last condition repetition (the slope of the differences between the
lines in Figure 11) was significantly different from zero for high proactive control individuals (t
= -4.75, p < .001) but not for low proactive control individuals (t = -1.28, p = .20), indicating
that there is only a change in the difference between the cued and uncued conditions as the
conditions were repeated for individuals with high proactive control. For the contrasts, high/low
proactive control was 1/-1 standard deviations from the mean.
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Table 2
Model fit: Error Optimality
Fixed Effects

β

B

SE

df

t

p

(Intercept)

0.37

0

0.01

502.54

46.27

<.001*

Condition Repetition

0.01

0.11

0.00

1,083.41

5.89

<.001*

Cue Type

0.01

0.07

0.01

847.34

1.49

0.14

Proactive Control

0.00

0.02

0.01

502.20

0.52

0.60

-0.01

-0.03

0.01

501.29

-0.67

0.50

Model-based Control

0.01

0.07

0.01

505.18

1.67

0.10

Condition Repetition X Cue Type

0.01

0.17

0.00

2,173.86

4.32

<.001*

Condition Repetition X Proactive Control

0.00

0.01

0.00

1,083.83

0.15

0.88

Condition Repetition X Intelligence

0.00

0.07

0.00

1,082.83

1.78

0.07

Control

0.00

-0.06

0.00

1,083.99

-1.30

0.19

Cue Type X Proactive Control

0.00

-0.02

0.01

847.36

-0.33

0.74

Cue Type X Intelligence

0.00

0.02

0.01

845.60

0.47

0.64

Cue Type X Model-based Control

0.01

0.05

0.01

851.13

1.00

0.32

0.00

0.10

0.00

2,171.67

2.42

0.02*

0.00

0.00

0.00

2,173.27

0.07

0.95

0.00

-0.01

0.00

2,174.61

-0.17

0.86

Intelligence

Condition Repetition X Model-based

Condition Repetition X Cue Type X
Proactive Control
Condition Repetition X Cue Type X
Intelligence
Condition Repetition X Cue Type X
Model-based Control

While the slope of optimal errors across repetitions of the condition was greater in the
cued condition than the uncued condition, as illustrated by the interaction in Figure 10, the slope
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of optimal errors across repetitions was still greater than zero in the uncued condition, indicating
that there is a general increase in error optimality as individuals encounter additional repetitions
of the task condition. There were two proposed explanations for why individuals might make
more optimal errors as the task progressed in the uncued blocks, where there is no structure to
learn: there are additional structural elements in the task other than those specified in the within
subjects manipulation, allowing individuals to benefit from additional context information in
later blocks; or, increased exposure to the task, regardless of the manipulation, allows individuals
to identify and select more efficacious search strategies in the initial trials of the block, leading to
improved learning and fewer context errors as the task progresses in both the cued and uncued
conditions. To test these proposed explanations, we examined the relationship between error
optimality and repetitions of the keysets used in uncued blocks, representing a previously
uncontrolled source of structure information. Results indicated that while participants did in fact
become more accurate with repeated keyset presentations, neither condition repetition (z = -.50,
p = .618) nor keyset repetition (z = -.003, p = .997) were significant predictors of error
optimality in uncued blocks.
While the interaction between repetition of the cue condition and cue type demonstrates
clear behavioral differences in response to changing task demands, it is unclear whether this
process is an explicit strategic choice or a more implicit process of exploration. If the behavior
expressed in this task is a function of explicit or conscious cognition, then there would likely be
categorically different approaches between high performers and low performers, limiting the
validity of the task. The distributions of error optimality for each condition are depicted in Figure
12. While there are a small number of participants with error optimality at ceiling who may be
executing a deliberate strategy, there is an approximately normal distribution centered around the
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mean, rather than a dichotomous distribution with a non-representative mean. Furthermore,
excluding all blocks where error optimality is greater than 0.9 does not change the statistical
significance of any of the reported results. This provides preliminary evidence to suggest that the
strategic differences between participants are implicit and a scalable function of their ability to
recognize and apply structure in a relatively consistent manner across subjects.

Figure 12
Distribution of Error Optimality
Note. The distribution of error optimality for each condition repetition is relatively normal and
centered around the mean for the condition/block. There is slightly less variability in
performance for the uncued condition than the cued condition, particularly as the task progresses.
The lines connecting violin plots in each facet show the mean error optimality for that condition
as in Figure 10. Data points represent one participant within each condition repetition.
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Accuracy
Mean response accuracy across blocks by cue condition over the first 15 stimulus
presentations is illustrated in Figure 13. The general linear mixed effects model described in Eq.
3 was fit to the first 10 stimulus repetitions, and the model fit is shown in Table 3. Mean
response accuracy was higher in cued blocks compared to uncued blocks, with a greater slope of
initial learning and higher asymptotic performance. Early cued trials had a higher initial accuracy
than uncued, indicating that context information was being used to constrain exploration from
four possible responses to two possible responses. There was an interaction between the number
of stimulus presentations and the cue condition on the probability of a correct response, showing
that participants learned faster in the cued condition where they were able to make use of context
information.
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Figure 13
Mean Response Accuracy
Note. Response accuracy was higher in cued blocks (solid line) compared to uncued blocks
(dashed line), particularly in early trials. Error bars indicate one standard error.
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Table 3
Model fit: Accuracy
β

Fixed Effects

B

(Intercept)

-0.48

0

0.05

-10.31

<.01*

Stimulus Repetition

2.31

1.52

0.09

27.03

<.01*

Cue Type

0.26

0.53

0.04

7.27

<.01*

Proactive Control

0.05

0.11

0.03

1.68

0.09

Intelligence

0.13

0.27

0.03

4.14

<.01*

Model-based Control

0.03

0.06

0.03

0.83

0.4

0.1

0.12

0.03

3.6

<.01*

Stimulus Repetition X Proactive Control

0.03

0.04

0.06

0.59

0.55

Stimulus Repetition X Intelligence

0.29

0.36

0.06

5.12

<.01*

Control

0.11

0.14

0.06

1.94

0.05

Cue Type X Proactive Control

0.04

0.08

0.03

1.39

0.17

Cue Type X Intelligence

0.03

0.07

0.03

1.25

0.21

Cue Type X Model-based Control

0.01

0.01

0.03

0.25

0.8

-0.03

-0.04

0.03

-1.38

0.17

0.01

0.01

0.03

0.4

0.69

0.02

0.02

0.03

0.72

0.47

Stimulus Repetition X Cue Type

SE

z

p

Stimulus Repetition X Model-based

Stimulus Repetition X Cue Type X
Proactive Control
Stimulus Repetition X Cue Type X
Intelligence
Stimulus Repetition X Cue Type X
Model-based Control

Having established that it is possible to learn the structure of a task and use that
information to facilitate future learning, the hypotheses concerning individual differences were
48

examined. It was expected that individuals who show a greater propensity to utilize cognitive
control will be more likely than individuals with low cognitive control to utilize higher-level
structural elements in the association learning task, as evidenced by faster learning when the
context is reinstated in later cued blocks. It was also expected that general fluid intelligence
would not predict rate of learning when the context is reinstated in later blocks. There was no
significant three-way interaction between any of the individual difference measures, stimulus
repetition, and cue condition, indicating that individual differences in cognitive control or fluid
intelligence do not explain differences in slope across conditions; nor were there interactions
between cue condition and any of the individual differences indicating that the initial accuracy
was not associated with any of the individual differences. These findings are inconsistent with
the results from the error optimality analysis, wherein individual differences in proactive control
significantly predicted context utilization in the structure task. This may be attributed to
methodological differences between the two models. The error optimality data were analyzed as
a proportion of optimal errors over the total number of errors in a block, rather than the
probability of an optimal error for each given trial. Changes in error optimality were therefore
assessed across repetitions of each condition, rather than within a single block. An alternative
model incorporating condition repetition into the accuracy data may be more consistent with
prior results.
There was, however, a significant interaction between the individual difference measure
of fluid intelligence and stimulus repetition (z = 5.12, p <.001), suggesting that individuals who
scored higher in fluid intelligence learned the associations faster. The interaction between fluid
intelligence and stimulus repetition is illustrated in Figure 14. Since the individual difference
measures were slightly correlated, it was possible that there were interactions between proactive
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control or model-based control and the rate of structure learning that shared variance with fluid
intelligence. To test this hypothesis, individual difference measures were entered into separate
regression models. Results did not show a significant interaction between proactive control,
stimulus repetition, and cue type or an interaction between model-based control, stimulus
repetition, and cue type.

Figure 14
Rate of Learning by Fluid Intelligence
Note. Rate of learning was faster for high fluid intelligence participants (dashed line) than the
medium (dotted line) or low fluid intelligence group (solid line). High, medium, and low
participants were determined using a tertile split. Error bars indicate one standard error.
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An additional model was specified to address the methodological differences between the
error optimality analysis and the accuracy models, incorporating condition repetition to
determine if there was a relationship between individual differences in cognitive control and the
number of condition repetitions required to identify structure in the cued condition, rather than
changes in accuracy within a single block. The model fit is presented in Table 4. Consistent with
the results from the block-level error optimality analysis, proactive control interacted
significantly with cue type and condition repetition (z = - 2.52, p = .01), demonstrated in Figure
15. This result suggests that over the course of the task, individuals higher in proactive control
apply structure learning more quickly than their low proactive control counterparts.
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Figure 15
Proactive Control by Condition Repetition
Note. There was a greater difference between the uncued and cued slopes over the course of the
task (repetitions of the condition) in the high proactive control condition than the low proactive
control condition. High, medium, and low proactive control was determined using a tertile split.
Error bars indicate one standard error.
Contrasts revealed a significant difference between the slopes of the cued and uncued
conditions across condition repetitions for the low proactive control group (z = -4.99, p < .001)
but not for the high proactive control group (z = -1.59, p = 0.11). This indicates that individuals
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who are low in proactive control are deriving increasing benefits from the structure information
as the task progresses because they are applying the structure information later; however, high
proactive control individuals are applying the structure information throughout the task. There
was also a lower order interaction between proactive control and cue type, indicating that
accuracy was greater for high proactive control individuals in the cued condition, but not in the
uncued condition for the first condition repetition (z = 2.22, p = .03). These results indicate that
proactive control influences the rate at which individuals recognize and apply structure as was
found in the error optimality analysis, however it does not influence the rate of learning within a
block. Individuals with a greater propensity to use proactive control recognize the structure
information of the task sooner than individuals who are lower in proactive control, and therefore
show a greater benefit from structure information in early repetitions of the cued condition
compared to low proactive control subjects.
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Table 4
Model fit: Condition Repetition
Fixed Effects

β

B

(Intercept)

SE

z

p

-0.59

0.00

0.06

-9.10

<.001*

Stimulus Repetition

1.98

1.31

0.09

20.92

<.001*

Cue Type

0.21

0.43

0.04

5.59

<.001*

Condition Repetition

0.23

0.16

0.09

2.61

0.01*

Proactive Control

0.06

0.12

0.04

1.34

0.18

Intelligence

0.13

0.26

0.04

2.99

<.01*

-0.02

-0.04

0.04

-0.44

0.66

Stimulus Repetition * Cue Type

0.10

0.13

0.03

3.81

<.001*

Stimulus Repetition * Condition Repetition

0.76

0.40

0.08

9.74

<.001*

Cue Type * Condition Repetition

0.11

0.14

0.03

4.42

<.001*

-0.02

-0.02

0.07

-0.22

0.83

Stimulus Repetition * Intelligence

0.31

0.38

0.07

4.42

<.001*

Stimulus Repetition * Model-based Control

0.03

0.04

0.07

0.47

0.64

Cue Type * Proactive Control

0.07

0.14

0.03

2.22

0.03*

Cue Type * Intelligence

0.04

0.07

0.03

1.18

0.24

Cue Type * Model-based Control

-0.04

-0.08

0.03

-1.27

0.20

Condition Repetition * Proactive Control

-0.01

-0.01

0.06

-0.12

0.91

Condition Repetition * Intelligence

0.01

0.01

0.06

0.09

0.93

Condition Repetition * Model-based Control

0.09

0.11

0.06

1.36

0.17

-0.04

-0.05

0.03

-1.55

0.12

0.01

0.01

0.03

0.42

0.67

0.03

0.03

0.03

1.05

0.29

Model-based Control

Stimulus Repetition * Proactive Control

Stimulus Repetition * Cue Type * Proactive Control
Stimulus Repetition * Cue Type * Intelligence
Stimulus Repetition * Cue Type * Model-based
Control
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Table 4 (continued)
Stimulus Repetition * Condition Repetition *
Proactive Control

0.09

0.07

0.07

1.23

0.22

-0.02

-0.01

0.08

-0.25

0.81

0.20

0.15

0.08

2.62

0.01*

-0.06

-0.07

0.02

-2.52

0.01*

0.00

-0.01

0.02

-0.18

0.86

0.10

0.12

0.02

3.97

<.001*

Stimulus Repetition * Condition Repetition *
Intelligence
Stimulus Repetition * Condition Repetition * Modelbased Control
Cue Type * Condition Repetition * Proactive Control
Cue Type * Condition Repetition * Intelligence
Cue Type * Condition Repetition * Model-based
Control

There was a significant interaction between model-based control, cue type, and condition
repetition (z = 3.97, p <.001), suggesting that individuals higher in model-based control apply
structure learning earlier than low model-based control individuals, as illustrated in Figure 16
Contrasts revealed a significant difference in the slope of condition repetition between the cued
and uncued condition for high model-based control participants (z = -5.86, p <.001), but not for
low model-based control subjects (z= -.56, p = .57). This indicates that individuals high in
model-based control continue to increase the degree to which they apply structure throughout the
task, whereas individuals low in model-based control plateau or do not continue to increase their
application of structure information. In other words, high model-based control subjects derive
some benefit from continued repetitions of the condition, whereas their low model-based control
counterparts do not.
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Figure 16
Model-based Control by Condition Repetition
Note. There is a greater difference between the slopes of the cued (solid) and uncued (dashed)
lines in the high model-based control condition than in the low model-based control condition.
High, medium, and low model-based control was determined using a tertile split. Error bars
indicate one standard error.
There was also a significant interaction between model-based control, stimulus repetition,
and condition repetition (z = 2.62, p = .01), illustrated in Figure 17. This interaction indicates that
individuals higher in model-based control learn faster within a block as the task progresses.
Contrasts indicate that for early condition repetitions, the slope of learning does not differ
between high model-based control and low model-based control participants (z = .47, p = .64); in
later repetitions, however, there is a significant difference in the slope of learning between high
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model-based control and low model-based control individuals (z = 3.2, p = .001). The previously
observed interaction between stimulus repetition and intelligence was still present with condition
repetition in the model (z = 4.42, p < .001).

Figure 17
Rate of Learning Across Condition Repetitions by Model-based Control
Note. The difference between the slopes of learning for high model-based control and low
model-based control subjects was greater in later blocks (repetitions of each condition) than
earlier blocks, illustrating an interaction between rate of learning, model-based control, and
position in the task.
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These results differ from the pattern observed with respect to proactive control.
Individuals higher in proactive control recognized the structure manipulation earlier than low
proactive control subjects, but ultimately reached an asymptotic performance level that was
equivalent to the low proactive control participants. Selecting and preparing a response that
corresponds with the task context is useful in that it constrains the action space; however, it does
not necessarily improve the rate at which associations are learned. Model-based control seems to
influence the benefit derived from repeated repetitions of a condition, or an individual’s ability to
apply structure information to improve learning. If model-based control is indicative of an
individual’s propensity to represent alternative states, then the negative feedback provided once
the correct keyset is identified should significantly improve future accuracy.
Model-based control may represent an individual’s ability to represent the alternative
value of a state, which would imply that individuals with a greater propensity to apply modelbased control will learn more from incorrect feedback, as this allows them to constrain their
search space on future trials, particularly once the keyset has been identified. While proactive
control facilitates subjects’ ability to recognize structure in a task, model-based control explains
how that structure information is used to derive more information from incorrect responses. To
test this hypothesis, a general linear mixed effects model was specified predicting the probability
of a correct response following an incorrect response on the previous presentation of the same
stimulus, representing the degree to which negative feedback was incorporated into future
decisions. Results demonstrated a significant interaction between stimulus repetition, previous
incorrect response, and model-based control. This suggests that individuals who are higher in
model-based control do in fact benefit more from negative feedback, resulting in a faster rate of
learning (z = 3.33, p <.001). There was also a significant lower-order interaction between model58

based control and previous incorrect response (z = -3.53, p <.001), indicating that individuals
with a greater capacity or propensity to apply model-based control achieve greater overall
accuracy when negative feedback is available.
As illustrated in Figures 13 and 14, the slope of accuracy across condition repetitions was
substantially greater in the cued condition than in the uncued condition; however, the slope of the
uncued condition across condition repetitions is greater than zero. It is possible that there are
implicit structure cues inherent to the task beyond what was manipulated/controlled, and that
some transfer is occurring between blocks or condition repetitions that is explained by something
other than the color cue. Two explanations were examined: there are additional structural
elements in the task other than those specified in the within subjects manipulation, allowing
individuals to benefit from additional context information in later blocks; or, increased exposure
to the task, regardless of the manipulation, allows individuals to identify and select more
efficacious search strategies in the initial trials of the block, leading to improved learning and
higher overall accuracy as the task progresses in both the cued and uncued conditions. To test
these proposed explanations, we examined the relationship between response accuracy and
repetitions of the keysets used in uncued blocks, representing a previously uncontrolled source of
structure information. The generalized linear mixed effects model revealed that that after
controlling for condition repetition, the repeated presentation of keysets did not explain
additional variance (z = -.126, p = .9). These findings indicate that improved accuracy in later
uncued blocks is a consequence of increased exposure to the task, rather than transferrable
structure information being utilized in the control condition.
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CHAPTER IV
DISCUSSION
The present study has significant implications for how we conceptualize structure
learning and controlled processes. First, it was evident that people can recognize and use the
structure of a task to facilitate learning, even without instruction or prompting, consistent with
previous literature suggesting that people learn associations at multiple hierarchical levels
(Collins et al., 2014; Newlin & Moss, 2020). Furthermore, structure learning appears to be a
beneficial process, as evidenced by greater accuracy and more efficient learning when structure
information can be used.
The key question explored by the present study was whether structure learning was a
controlled process and, therefore, mediated by individual differences in control. Proactive control
influences the rate at which individuals identify or apply structure learning, as individuals high in
proactive control use structure in earlier repetitions of the cued condition than low proactive
control individuals. Proactive control represents a sustained form of control where the task goal
is continually maintained and updated (Braver, 2012; Meier & Kane, 2017). In the context of the
present study, proactive control allows individuals to select and prepare responses that
correspond to a given context; in other words, proactive control explains the degree to which
individuals can utilize a task set once it has been created. Individuals with a low propensity to
use proactive control learn associations and recognize task structure at a similar rate to
individuals high in proactive control; however, these individuals are less able to retrieve and
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apply the correct rules when the context is reinstated, as evidenced by a greater number of
repetitions of the cued condition required to apply the structure appropriate to the context.
Proactive control seems to influence an individual’s ability to apply the context-key associations
that have been learned.
Model-based control represents the interaction between goal-directed mechanisms in
proactive control and structured reinforcement learning (Braver, 2012; Kool et al., 2017). In
other words, model-based control is the propensity to apply control in a task scenario, above and
beyond individual differences in propensity to use proactive control. It was expected that
proactive control and model-based control would have a large proportion of shared variance;
however, results showed that the relationship was minimal (5% shared variance). This may
indicate that proactive control and model-based control are separate constructs, rather than
multiple measures of a unitary cognitive control factor; however, there is not sufficient evidence
to claim that these are separate constructs, especially considering the low reliability of the AXCPT task. Although proactive control influences the degree to which individuals are able to
select and prepare responses that correspond with a given context, model-based control may be
the likelihood that alternative states will be represented and updated when an action is made. For
example, knowing that either “s” or “f” is the correct key based on context is one thing, but
updating knowledge of the “f” key’s correctness when “s” is pressed may require the updating of
multiple states. This explains why model-based control predicted the rate of learning within a
block as the task progressed, while proactive control did not. Like proactive control, modelbased control also predicts the point at which structure learning will be applied to a repeated
context, however, for different reasons; proactive control is an individual's ability to recognize
that the context is repeated and constrain the action space accordingly, or maintain the current
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states, whereas model-based control represents an individual's propensity to represent the value
of alternative states. In the current study, model-based control allows an individual to learn the
correct response when given information about the incorrect response.
Structure learning was not explained by general fluid intelligence; however, the overall
rate of learning within a block was. General fluid intelligence (gF) represents the ability to
respond to novelty, whether by solving novel problems or accommodating novel contexts (Engle
et al., 1999). In the present study, intelligence explains the general rate of learning in the
structure task, regardless of the cue condition. Simply put, gF determines the number of trials
necessary to infer the association between a novel stimulus and the correct response. One
possible explanation for the relationship between learning and intelligence is the role of working
memory. Working memory is a capacity limited store that temporarily holds task-relevant
information (Baddeley et al., 2020). gF and working memory, while separate constructs, have a
large proportion of shared variance (Ackerman et al., 2005; Engle et al., 1999). The number of
items or stimulus-action associations held in working memory may explain the rate at which
individuals are able to learn this task; once a response is rendered and feedback is provided, the
association between the stimulus and response, whether correct or incorrect, can be maintained
in working memory until the stimulus reappears, constraining the action space on subsequent
stimulus repetitions. Individuals with a higher working memory capacity may be able to store
more stimulus-response pairings and should therefore learn faster from both correct and incorrect
responses. Future research should explore the potential interaction between working memory and
intelligence by including measures of individual differences in working memory to determine
whether capacity limitations explain the rate at which individuals learn associations.
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Existing frameworks of HRL propose that reinforcement learning occurs simultaneously
at multiple levels, and that updating the transition function in one state has implications for the
states below it in the hierarchy (Collins, 2018). For HRL to be effective individuals must also
identify the hierarchical organization of these various levels and correctly select the “entry point”
into the task set that will provide the greatest degree of benefit while still allowing for transfer to
future contexts. For example, in the structure learning task used in the present study, participants
may learn the association between keypresses and images, the association between colors and
keysets, the association between objects and keysets, and the association between keysets and
blocks. Each combination of these elements represents a valid hierarchical organization, or task
set; however, only one task set configuration will lead to a future high-value state. Cognitive
control allows individuals to associate the hierarchy created in HRL with a repeated context. In
the structure learning task, participants must first identify the color cue as the pertinent context
information, then maintain the color context while learning the lower-level associations, and
finally, recognize when the context has been reinstated and activate the correct task set for that
context. Individual differences in cognitive control may explain variability at any one or all of
these steps in HRL.
One alternative explanation of why individuals learn structure differently is differences in
the strategies employed at the time the task set is created. The manipulation in the present study
assumes that individuals will recognize the color cue as the transferrable structural element,
however, it is also possible to learn the association between the keyset and a pair of objects from
different color cues. In this case, subjects are still attempting to learn the structure of the task,
however, they are using a nontransferable cue resulting in differences in performance in later
blocks. What does seem clear is that, in the absence of a cue identifying the structure, individuals
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are unlikely to spontaneously organize the action space into transferable structural elements, as
evidenced by the absence of structure learning in uncued blocks that share a response keyset.
Another alternative explanation that was not explored in the present study is working memory. It
is possible that differences in whether individuals choose to maintain a task context
representation in working memory are dictated simply by working memory capacity and are not
mediated by cognitive control. In other words, task representations are always held in working
memory, but an individual’s ability to maintain the task representation may be limited by
working memory capacity. However, given the established relationship between working
memory and gF (Ackerman et al., 2005; Engle et al., 1999), it seems unlikely that working
memory capacity would explain individual differences in behavior not already captured by gF in
the present study.
Examining cognitive processes such as working memory may also yield additional
insight about how individuals select the strategies they are using in this task and if qualitatively
different approaches are represented explicitly by the participant. At present, it is difficult to
definitively say whether these processes are explicit (conscious) or implicit (unconscious);
however, a closer examination of the distribution of responses across the task seems to indicate
that differences between individuals are continuous and scalable, not categorically different.
Future studies may use verbal protocols to explore the strategies applied during the initial search
process of the task in early blocks to determine the strategic decisions individuals make and the
degree to which participants are aware of structural cues.
Proactive control seems to be more indicative of applying the structure when it is
relevant, whereas model-based control allows individuals to represent the differential value of
alternative states. These concepts are related (Otto et al., 2014), and share some variance that
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cannot be explained by simple differences in intelligence; however, the relationship is ultimately
minor. The similarities and differences between these constructs may be explored using an
alternative learning task with an increased number of states that may be updated rather than a
task where the structure remains the same, calling upon an individual’s ability to represent states
(model-based control) rather than their ability to apply their knowledge of the task structure
(proactive control). Future research could modify the structure learning task used in the present
study so that different keypress-stimulus associations yield different reward values, with
changing reward values as the task progresses. Participants would then be required to represent
multiple alternative values for each state, depending on the task context.
Limitations of the current task include the reliability of the individual differences
measures and some potential flaws in the presentation of the structure information in the
structure learning task. The reliability of the model-based control parameter extracted from the
two-step task was unable to be accurately assessed, and the proactive control measure
demonstrated relatively low reliability. Reliability is a crucial psychometric property for
assessing individual differences, as this ultimately determines the degree to which a true effect
can be consistently detected within and between subjects. Additionally, the relationship between
proactive control and model-based control was minimal; however, current theoretical accounts of
these processes seem to indicate that while not isomorphic, proactive control and model-based
control are certainly related and contingent on one another. Simply put, and individual would be
unable to apply model-based control, the representation of the value of alternative states, without
first recognizing the organization of these states, as allowed by proactive control. Therefore, it is
reasonable to suggest that the absence of a meaningful relationship between these measures is a
function of limited reliability in these tasks. Low reliability may have reduced our ability to
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detect an effect, yet despite this limitation, we still detected a significant effect of individual
differences in cognitive control on structure learning. Future research should explore alternative
measures of model-based control and proactive control that may provide clearer insight into the
identity and relationship of these constructs.
Several assumptions underlie the interpretation of results from the Structure Task: first
and foremost, it is assumed that participants can and do use the color cues associated with
images to create two separate context-keyset association patterns within a single block, rather
than learning four discrete image-keypress associations. In the cued (structure) condition, the
same pair of colors is presented for each repetition of the condition; therefore, it is difficult to
determine the extent to which individuals independently learned the color-keyset associations.
Future research should extend the design of the current study to include additional blocks
wherein one of the colors is repeated, but the second color is unique and nontransferrable. This
may differentiate between two categorically different approaches to this task. Finally, while the
evidence supports the hypothesis that individuals are capable of learning and applying structure
information, it is difficult to dissociate structure learning from baseline task performance. Future
research may overcome this by including practice trials with no context information
(transferrable or otherwise) and analyzing the structure manipulation with the baseline learning
rate as a covariate.
Based on the relationships identified between structure learning, proactive control, and
model-based control, we can surmise that structure learning is a controlled process mediated by
individual differences in capacity or propensity to apply cognitive control. Additionally, results
indicated that intelligence explains the overall rate of learning in novel contexts but not an

66

individual's ability to recognize or apply structure. Future research will explore potential
interactions with working memory capacity, attention, and executive function.
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